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Abstract
It is well recognized that data are invaluable. How can we assess
the value of data objectively, systematically and quantitatively? Pricing
data, or information goods in general, has been studied and practiced in
dispersed areas and principles, such as economics, marketing, electronic
commerce, data management, data mining and machine learning. In this
article, we present a unified, interdisciplinary and comprehensive overview
of this important direction. We examine various motivations behind data
pricing, understand the economics of data pricing and review the develop-
ment and evolution of pricing models according to a series of fundamental
principles. We cover both digital products and data products. Last, we
discuss a series of challenges and directions for future work.
1 Introduction
In this digital economics era, data are well recognized as an essential resource for
work and life. Many products and services are delivered purely in digital forms.
Many big data applications are built on the second use or reuse of data [182],
that is, the same data are customized and reused by many applications for
different purposes. The extensive sharing and reusing data has profound impli-
cations to economy. For example, digital maps are often produced for traffic and
directions as the immediate usage. However, Nagaraj [142] finds that mining
activities were strongly benefited by open maps or maps sponsored by govern-
ments, particularly by smaller firms with less resources. Universal availability
of data often helps minority parties and emerging initiatives.
In business and economic activities where data are shared, exchanged and
reused, it is essential to measure the value of data properly. While there exist
many possible ways to appreciate and represent the value of data, a general
approach that can be scalable for massive applications and acceptable to many
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parties is to set a price at which data can be sold or purchased, that is, data
pricing. The importance of price in business is well recognized in financial
modeling [112], as price being one of the four Ps of the marketing mix1.
Pricing data is far from trivial. Data have many different aspects. Con-
sequently, the term “price of data” may carry different meanings and refer to
different properties of data. To illustrate the complexity, let us quickly consider
the following three scenarios involving price information related to data.
• Data transmission. Imagine the scenario where a mobile service provider
offers a smart phone user the price of its data package. Here, the price is
quoted for the data transmission service, and is decided by several factors,
such as the amount of data the user wants to transmit in a month time, the
location (roaming or not, for example), and the transmission speed. The
price does not include and is independent from the content, that is, what
the data are about, such as data quality, and how the data are collected,
stored or process.
• Digital products. Imagine that a person wants to watch a movie at home.
This is a purchase of data, since the movie is sent to the customer’s home
as a stream of bits. The price here typically is related to the content, but
is independent from the data transmission service, that is, how the data
are transmitted to the user’s home.
• Data products. Many logistics companies want to pay for weather infor-
mation to support their business operations. While historical data are rel-
evant, more often than not those companies want to subscribe to weather
forecasting information instead. Some companies may want weather pre-
dictions at a higher granularity while some may want detailed predictions
at specific locations. Moreover, some may want long term predictions
while some others may want short term projections. Here, prediction ser-
vices are sold as data products.
The above three cases just elaborate some representative scenarios where
data prices are used, and are by no means exhaustive. To appreciate data pric-
ing, including ideas, principles and methods, we have to take an interdisciplinary
approach from multiple fields, economics and data science being the two most
prominent. Indeed, the studies and practice of data pricing started as early as
the dawn of digital economics, and are highly diversified and rich in innovative
thinking.
In this article, we try to present a comprehensive survey on data pricing, an
emerging research and practice area that plays a more and more important role
in the current big data and AI economics era. Our survey is highly related to
1The four Ps are product, price, place and promotion [112].
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the current strong rising of data science. To a large extent, data pricing is an
overdue pillar in data science research and practice.
Data and information as goods discussed in this article are those that are dis-
tributed purely in digital form. We focus on two categories of the most interest:
pricing digital products and pricing data products, demonstrated by the afore-
mentioned scenarios, respectively. In this article, digital products refer to those
intangible goods but can be consumed through electronics, such as e-books,
downloadable musics, online ads, and internet coupons. Many digital products
have physical correspondences in one way or another, though not absolutely
necessary. Data products refer to data sets as products and information services
derived from data sets. We build the linkage between these two categories by
pointing out many ideas and methods on pricing digital products can be gen-
eralized and applied to pricing data products. In some scenarios, the boundary
between digital products and data products are also blurry. Hereafter, we use
the term information goods to refer to both digital products and data products.
1.1 Related Surveys
The research into data pricing happens simultaneously in multiple domains,
including but not limited to economics, marketing, e-commerce, databases and
data management, operational research, management science, machine learning
and AI. However, to the best of our knowledge, there exists very limited effort
to provide an interdisciplinary survey of the related work. This article presents
our endeavor to produce a comprehensive picture.
There are some previous surveys related to data pricing. For example,
Liang et al. [127] survey the life cycle of big data, and reviews 11 data pricing
models. They also discuss data trading and protection. Fricker and Maksi-
mov [73] report a literature survey over 18 research articles regarding several
research questions, including maturity of the pricing models and pricing models.
This article covers a substantially broader scope than those [73, 127]. We con-
nect economics, digital product pricing and data product pricing. We also dis-
cuss a series of desirable properties in data pricing, including arbitrage-freeness,
revenue maximization, fairness and truthfulness, and privacy preservation, and
review the techniques achieving those properties.
Data pricing is related to cloud pricing, since a lot of data for pricing and
trading are hosted on cloud. Wu et al. [191] present a comprehensive survey on
cloud pricing models. They systematically categorize three fundamental pric-
ing strategies, namely value-based pricing, cost-based pricing and market-based
pricing. Then, they further categorize nine pricing tactical objects. Specifically,
value-based pricing is demand driven and consists of customer value-based pric-
ing, experience-based pricing, and service-based pricing. Cost-based pricing is
supply driven and consists of expenditure-based pricing, resource-based pricing
3
and utility-based pricing. Market-based pricing is an equilibrium of supply and
demand and consists of free and pay later pricing, retail-based pricing and auc-
tion and online pricing. They cover in total 60 pricing models. While data and
cloud are highly related, data pricing and cloud pricing are fundamentally dif-
ferent. Data pricing is selling data, while cloud pricing is selling cloud resources
(e.g., storage and computation), including physical resources, virtual resources
and stateless resources.
In addition, Murthy et al. [139] list different pricing models and pric-
ing schemes used by some popular IaaS (infrastructure-as-a-service) providers.
Wu et al. [195] propose pricing as a service, which is essentially a personalized
pricing service for IaaS. Aazam and Huh [1] propose broker as a service, which
matches cloud services among cloud service providers and users. The key idea
is to predict resource demands and thus derive prices.
As data are often hosted online, one interesting question is the fair sharing
of the cost among data owners, data users and brokers. This is related to data
pricing, because the costs of data hosting and processing have to be recovered
from data pricing. Kantere et al. [109] study the fair allocation of costs in query
services. They develop a stochastic model, which predicts the extent of cost
amortization in time and number of services based on query traffic statistics.
The model can be implemented on top of a cloud DBMS. Al-Kiswany et al. [12]
provide a cost assessment tool to evaluate the cost of a desired data sharing. One
useful feature of the tool is that a user can explore the cost space of alternative
configurations using various factors, such as quality, staleness, and accuracy.
The technique is based on what-if analysis.
1.2 Structure of This Survey
We take a multi-disciplinary approach in this survey. The rest of the article is
organized as follows.
In Section 2, we start from economics and focus on two aspects. First,
we discuss cost reduction in information goods that contributes to their prices
and has impact on economics. Then, we discuss the differences between digital
products and data products.
In Section 3, we discuss the fundamental principles of data pricing. We
first present versioning as a general framework for pricing information goods.
Then, we identify several desirable properties in data pricing, including truth-
fulness, fairness, revenue-maximization, arbitrage-freeness, privacy preservation
and computational efficiency.
In Section 4, we discuss pricing digital products. We first review the three
major streams of revenues for digital products. Then, we revisit the bundling
and subscription planning pricing models. Last, we consider auctions, which
are widely used in pricing digital products.
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In Section 5, we discuss pricing data products. We first overview the
structures, players, and ways to produce data products in data marketplaces.
Then, we examine several important areas in pricing data products, including
arbitrage-free pricing, revenue maximization pricing, fair and truthful pricing,
privacy preservation in pricing. We also discuss how to price dynamic data and
online pricing.
In Section 6, we discuss challenges and future directions.
2 Economics of Data Pricing
In general, pricing is the practice that a business sets a price at which a prod-
uct or a service can be sold. Pricing is often part of the marketing plan of a
business. To set prices, a business often considers a series of objectives, such as
profitability, fitness in marketplace, market positioning, price consistency across
categories and products, and meeting or preventing competition. Some major
pricing strategies in literature [38, 57, 103, 144, 148] include operation-oriented
pricing, revenue-oriented pricing, customer-oriented pricing, value-oriented pric-
ing, and relationship-oriented pricing. There is a rich body of studies in eco-
nomics and marketing research on pricing tactics, which are far beyond the
scope and capacity of this survey.
In this section, to understand the economic factors specific to data pricing,
we examine the cost reduction in information goods. Then, we inspect the
differences between digital products and data as products.
2.1 Cost Reduction in Information Goods
“Technology changes. Economic laws do not.” [169] The production, distri-
bution, and consumption of information goods, comparing to those of physical
products in the long history of human economies, are distinguished by significant
cost reductions on five aspects, namely search costs, production costs, replica-
tion costs, transportation costs, and tracking and verification costs. Essentially,
digital and data economics investigates how standard economic models adjust
when those costs are reduced dramatically. Goldfarb and Tucker [90] present a
thorough discussion, whose framework is largely followed here.
2.1.1 Search Costs
“Search costs are the costs of looking for information” [169], which are incurred
in any information collection activities. Information goods allow more effective
and efficient online search. The consequent low search costs facilitate users’
discovering digital products and data sets, as well as comparing prices of similar
products and services. For example, Brynjolfsson and Smith [40] show that
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online prices of books and CDs are clearly lower than offline, though the price
dispersion, however, does not shrink accordingly.
Low search costs facilitate the sales of rare and long tail products [15, 197].
Thus, more variety is often observed in information goods and services. The
degree of variety may be heavily impacted by recommender systems. Specific to
consumption of media, one of the major categories of digital products, Gentzkow
and Shapiro [80] show that online media consumption is more diverse than
offline. At the same time, customers may tend to consume more that aligns more
or less with their viewpoints, which is called the “echo chamber” effect [174].
Low search costs give strong rise to the prevalent platform businesses,
which provide extensive matching services to customers and improve trade ef-
ficiency [108]. Interoperability, compatibility and standards are strategic tools
for both building platforms and running platform businesses [96].
2.1.2 Production Costs
Producing digital products, such as online courses, eBooks, software, graphics
and digital arts, and photography, is very different from manufacturing physical
products, like bread, shoes, and jackets. Moreover, collecting and processing
massive data so that parts of data can be sold and can meet customers’ needs is
also different from traditional production. A wide spectrum of production costs
in traditional products are substantially reduced in information goods.
First, some essential major costs in traditional production, such as materials,
semifinished products and their transportation, are dramatically reduced in pro-
ducing information goods. In many cases, the costs of obtaining, producing and
transporting raw materials and physical semifinished products can be reduced to
very low or can even approach zero in making information goods. Second, a sub-
stantial cost of a traditional physical product often belongs to the product itself
and cannot be further reduced through sharing. The unit costs of information
goods can approach zero through sharing as long as there are sufficient reuses
and sales volume. Last, smart manufacturing and customer-to-manufacturing
can reduce the supply chain costs in traditional physical production [85, 173].
Information goods often can reduce the costs of customization to extreme.
The substantial reduction in production cost in materials, semifinished prod-
ucts, customization and sharing gives rise to a series of innovative business
models, such as economics of sharing, pay-as-you-go and query-based data con-
sumption. This also encourages innovation and long tail products that address
diverse and smaller groups of potential customers.
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2.1.3 Replication Costs
One distinct feature of information goods versus traditional products is that
information goods are non-rival. That is, one customer consuming an infor-
mation good does not reduce the amount or quality of the product what are
available to other customers. The zero marginal costs and the non-rival prop-
erty of information goods empower innovative opportunities and brings in new
challenges.
In order to structure pricing of a large variety of non-rival information goods
with zero marginal costs, bundling is often used [169], that is, multiple products
are sold together at a single price. Since a large number of information goods
can be bundled together without a substantial increase in cost, economically it
may be optimal to bundle thousands of digital products together to meet diverse
and independent customer preferences [10,25,26].
Due to the zero marginal costs and the non-rivalrous property, many infor-
mation goods are made publicly available, such as Wikipedia2 and open source
software [122]. People contribute to open source or publicly available digital
products and data to demonstrate their professional skills to potential employ-
ers. Companies support those products to complement their sales on other
products.
The zero marginal costs and non-rivalrous property post challenges to copy-
right policies and enforcement. Waldfogel [188] shows that low replication costs,
though may reduce revenue, help supplies and demands, and thus boost quality.
Williams [190] shows that the protection of intellectual properties indeed has
negative impact on follow-on innovation in gene sequencing.
At the same time, there are evidences showing that governments mandate
“open data” may lead to data leakages and privacy breaches that affect citizens’
offline welfare [5]. On the negative side, the zero marginal costs or non-rivalrous
nature also ease the way for spamming [163] and online crime [138].
2.1.4 Transportation Costs
Thanks to the Internet, the costs of transporting information goods approach
zero. This may imply that local communities may not affect adoptions and
consumptions of information goods, often known as the effect of flat world [74].
Interestingly, this is not quite true, as some studies demonstrate that tastes may
still be local in music [71] and content consumption [79].
While the physical transportation may approach zero, regulation may put so-
phisticated constraints on locations. For example, when Wekipedia was blocked
in China in October 2005, more contributors from outside China were moti-
vated to contribute [202]. Copyright policies may also affect the availability and
2https://www.wikipedia.org
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consumption of information goods in different regions, such as news media [45],
and thus may be reflected by price.
2.1.5 Tracking and Verification Costs
The capability of tracking users with relatively low costs is an important feature
of information goods [169]. The low tracking costs give the rise to extensive per-
sonalized markets and possible price discrimination [75, 154]. Behavioral price
discrimination is an immediate type, which sets prices according to customers’
previous behavior. Correspondingly, if customers are well aware of the bene-
fits of tracking information to a monopoly, they may likely choose to be privacy
sensitive and hold the information [179]. Another type of price discrimination is
versioning [170], which sells information at different prices to different customers
using different versions. Versioning is discussed in detail in Section 3.1.
The advantage of low tracking costs also leads to the blooming businesses of
personalized advertising [68]. A challenge for a company, however, is how to set
prices for many advertisements that may be shown to massive customers? The
same advertisement may have different prices for different customers. Auctions
are often used to address the challenge [19]. Auctions can also be used to
discover prices for information goods [153]. At the same time, auctions may be
less useful when online marketplaces become mature [65].
The low tracking costs and the consequences, such as price discrimination,
lead to serious concerns on privacy [4]. As to be discussed later in this article,
whether privacy should be treated as goods and how privacy is priced are in-
vestigated [72,152]. Moreover, privacy regulation and the impact on welfare are
important topics, though they are far beyond the scope of this survey.
As a byproduct of low tracking costs, the costs of verifying identity and
reputation of producers and users of information goods are dramatically lower
than those in traditional scenarios. The low verification costs facilitate online
transactions extensively and lower the costs of trust dramatically.
2.2 Differences between Digital Products and Data Prod-
ucts
This survey focuses on pricing two categories of information goods, digital prod-
ucts and data products. While digital products and data products share a series
of common ideas and methods in pricing, they are also essentially different from
each other on at least four aspects.
First, the units of digital products are often well defined and fixed. For
example, individual movies and musics are often priced and sold in whole. The
consumption of a digital product is often independent from each other. For
example, it would be rare that two digital books have to be read at the same
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time. In contrast, although the basic unit in a data set can be at very small
granularity, such as a record in a relational table, the units for pricing and
consumption often vary from one customer to another. For example, a customer
may be interested in the sales data of female customers in a province, while
another customer may be interested in the sales data on electronics during the
Christmas season. Correspondingly, one individual unit of data at the lowest
granularity may not be valuable as a data product. For example, one customer
purchase record, after proper anonymization, may not be useful for a retailer.
Instead, more often than not, many basic units of data are combined, aggregated
and consumed together.
Second, different from digital products, data sets as data products have
very strong and flexible aggregateability. Customers often aggregate data us-
ing various dimensions. The aggregateability, on the one hand, enables many
opportunities for innovations in data business, and, on the other hand, posts
many technical and business challenges, such as ensuring arbitrage-freeness as
to be discussed later in this article. In many business scenarios, digital products
like movies and musics are bundled. However, bundles are not aggregates. Cus-
tomers still get digital products and consume them individually. Bundling is
to take the advantage of low replication costs of digital products to boost sales
and meet customers’ diverse demands [10,25,26].
Third, the means of consuming digital products and data products are also
very different. Typically digital products are consumed directly by people, such
as movies watched by people and musics enjoyed by fans. Data sets are more
often than not consumed by computers. They are, for example, analyzed, sum-
marized or used to train machine learning models. The outputs of models are
used to automate operations or support human decision making.
Last, digital products and data products are dramatically different in ways
to be reused and resold. Digital products are easy to be consumed by others,
that is, to be reused, or even to be resold to others in whole. Data sets, to
the contrary, can be reused by others in different ways, such as aggregation in
different dimensions and analysis for different purposes. Moreover, data can be
easily processed and transformed so that they can be resold in a hard-to-detect
manner.
The above differences between digital products and data products lead to
different considerations in pricing principles and methods, which are discussed
later. Before we leave this topic, we want to point out that it is possible that the
same information can be regarded as digital products in some situations and as
data products in some other situations. For example, social media like tweets
and customer reviews can be regarded as digital products when a customer reads
them online. At the same time, they can be collected and processed in batch by
analytic tools to detect events, discover customer profiles and feed recommender
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systems. In this situation, a systematic collection of social media can be priced
and sold as a data product.
2.3 Summary
In summary, information goods, including digital products and data products,
distinguish themselves from the traditional physical products in significant cost
reductions, particularly in search costs, production costs, replication costs,
transportation costs, and tracking and verification costs. The significant re-
duction of costs has profound impact on pricing information goods, which are
discussed in the later sections of this article. There are several major differences
between digital products and data products, including consumption units, ag-
gregatebility, means of consumption, and reusing and reselling.
3 Fundamental Principles of Data Pricing
In this section, we first review the idea of versioning [169,170], which is a funda-
mental framework of designing information goods and pricing them. Then, we
review several important properties in cost models of digital and data products.
3.1 Versioning
As the replication costs of information goods are very low, even approaching
zero in many cases, the price of an information good tends to be very low in
marketplaces, too. The potential of very low prices of information goods, on
the one hand, makes information goods economically appealing, and, on the
other hand, may also make information goods economically dangerous, as the
competitors may easily enter the market [169, 170]. This dilemma keeps many
traditional pricing strategies far away from being effective.
To tackle the dilemma, the core idea is “linking price to value”, that is,
setting the price reflecting the value that a customer places on the information.
Specifically, the versioning strategy [170] makes different versions to appeal to
different types of customers. For example, for a piece of software, different
versions have different subsets of features. Different versions of a movie may
provide different image resolutions and sound effects. Essentially, versioning di-
vides customers into subgroups so that each subgroup may regard some features
highly valuable and some other features of little value. A version corresponding
to the demands can be provided.
There are many different ways to produce different versions of information
goods. For example, delay is often a good basis. In stock market informa-
tion services, an expensive version may deliver real time quotes while a basic
version delivers the same information 20 minutes later. In addition, versions
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may be defined by convenience (e.g., data can be accessed only by PDF file or
by downloadable spreadsheet), comprehensiveness (e.g., the length of historical
data available), manipulation (e.g., whether users can store, duplicate, print
the information), community (e.g., availability of posting and reading discus-
sion boards), annoyance (e.g., the option of no advertisements), the means of
customer support (e.g., by website only or by talking to experts), and many
other factors. Most versions of information goods are created by subtracting
value from the most technologically advanced and complete version.
In many situations where customers may not realize the value of an informa-
tion good unless they try it, even the free versions may be provided. The ratio-
nale is that the free versions can provide opportunities to potential customers
to test out. The objectives of offering free versions include building awareness,
gaining follow-on sales, creating a customer network, attracting attentions, and
gaining competitive advantages.
The number of versions of an information good may be decided by two
major considerations. First, the characteristics of the information to be sold is
important. An information good that can be used in many different ways opens
the door to many different versions. The second important factor is the value
that different customers may place on it.
The versioning strategy has been investigated in pricing data products, for
example, relational data sets and query results [27, 28]. Relational views pro-
vide a natural and flexible technical mean to produce versions of an information
source. A series of technical challenges are identified, such as arbitrage in pric-
ing, fine-grained data pricing, pricing updates, integrated data and competing
data sources, which are reviewed further in this article.
3.2 Important Desiderata in Data Pricing
There are many different ways to design and implement pricing models for
information goods. There are a small number of desiderata pursued by most
models. How to implement those desiderata in pricing models is discussed in
the later sections.
3.2.1 Truthfulness
To make a market efficient, the market is preferred to be truthful. A market
is truthful if every buyer is selfish and only offers the price that maximizes the
buyer’s true utility value. In other words, in a truthful market, no buyer pays
more than sufficient to purchase a product. Here, different buyers may have
different utility values on the same product. Truthfulness can facilitate a wide
spectrum of pricing mechanisms, such as many kinds of auctions [7]. Auctions
of digital products are discussed in Section 4.3.
11
3.2.2 Revenue Maximization
Pricing models can optimize different objectives, such as lowest cost, highest
profit, and largest sales. The objective of maximizing revenue is often of special
interest in designing pricing strategies. The rationale is that, for a business to
be successful long term, a more immediate and important requirement is to win
over as many customers as possible.
For traditional physical products, it is often assumed that the marginal cost
goes up after a certain number of units are manufactured, and thus the profit
can be maximized if the output level is set so that the marginal revenue is equal
to the marginal cost, and the revenue can be maximized if the marginal revenue
becomes zero. However, given that the replication costs of information goods
are very low, revenue maximization and profit maximization for information
products become quite different from the physical products [7, 41].
3.2.3 Fairness
Essentially, a market is fair if each seller gets the fair share of the revenue
in coalition. In his seminal article [171], Shapley lays out the fundamental
requirements of fairness in markets. Suppose there are k sellers cooperatively
participate in a transaction that leads to a payment v. There are four basic
requirements for being fair.
• Balance: the sum of the payment to each seller should be equal to v. That
is, the payment is fully distributed to all sellers.
• Symmetry : for a set of sellers S and two additional sellers s and s′ who
are not in S, that is, s, s′ 6∈ S, if S ∪ {s} and S ∪ {s′} produce the same
payment, then s and s′ should receive the same payment. That is, the
same contribution to utility should be paid the same.
• Zero element : for a set of sellers S and an additional seller s 6∈ S, if S∪{s}
and S produce the same payment, then s should receive a payment of 0.
That is, no contribution, no payment.
• Additivity : If the goods can be used for two tasks T1 and T2 with payment
v1 and v2, respectively, then the payment to complete both tasks T1 + T2
is v1 + v2.
In the above well celebrated Shapley fairness, the Shapley value is the unique
allocation of payment that satisfies all the requirements.
ψ(s) =
∑
S⊆D\{s}
U(S ∪ (s))− U(S)(
n−1
|S|
) (1)
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where U() is the utility function, D is the complete set of sellers, S ⊆ D is a set
of sellers, and s is a seller.
Equivalently, Equation 1 can also be written as
ψ(s) =
1
N !
∑
pi∈Π(D)
(U(Ppis ∪ {s})− U(Ppis )) (2)
where pi ∈ Π(D) is a permutation of all sellers, and Ppii is the set of sellers
preceding s in pi.
Agarwal et al. [7] observe that, as the replication costs of information goods
are very low, the marginal costs of production are close to zero, a seller can
produce more units of the same information good to obtain a larger Shapley
value and thus a larger portion of the payment unjustified in business. This is
a challenge in designing fair marketplace for information goods.
3.2.4 Arbitrage-free Pricing
Arbitrage is the activities that take advantage of price differences between two
or more markets or channels. For example, consider a scenario where a user
wants to purchase the access to an article, whose listed price is $35. Suppose
that the journal publishing the article has a monthly subscription rate of $25.
Then, the user can conduct arbitrage to subscribe to the journal for only one
month and obtain the article at a price cheaper than the listed price.
Arbitrage is often undesirable in pricing models. At least it should be able to
check whether a pricing model is arbitrage-free. However, arbitrage can sneak
in pricing models that are not thoroughly designed. For example, suppose a
data service provider sells query results with prices based on variance [124], a
variance of 10 for $5 each query result and a variance of 1 for $100 each query
result. Each answer is perturbed independently. A customer who wants to
obtain an answer of variance of 1 can purchase the query 10 times and compute
their average. Due to the independent noise in perturbation, the aggregated
average has variance 1, and thus the customer saves $50 by arbitrage.
3.2.5 Privacy-preservation
Privacy is becoming a more and more serious concern about information goods.
In general, privacy is the ability of an individual or a group to keep themselves or
the information about themselves hidden from being identified or approached by
other people. Privacy is highly related to information and information exchange,
which are what information goods about.
As explained in Section 2.1.5, due to the low tracking costs of information
goods, it is easier to collect data about user privacy [4]. Whether privacy should
be treated as goods and how privacy is priced are investigated [72,152].
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It is highly desirable to preserve privacy in marketplaces of information
goods. In general, transactions in a marketplace may disclose privacy of various
parties in many different ways.
First, privacy of buyers is highly vulnerable. Their identities, the location
and time of purchases, specific products purchased, the purchase prices and
total amount may reflect their privacy. It has been reported from time to time
that e-commerce providers leak customer information by mistakes, such as an
accident reported recently3.
Second, privacy of information good providers may also be disclosed. For
example, medical treatment information in hospitals is highly valuable for many
business companies, such as pharmacy medical equipment companies. Imagine
that hospitals can collect and anonymize medical treatment data properly and
provide the corresponding data products in marketplaces so that individual
patients cannot be re-identified. Buyers, however, may be able to infer from
the data the successful rates of a specific treatment in a hospital, which may be
regarded as the privacy of the hospital.
Last, transactions in marketplaces may also disclose privacy of a third party
involved. For example, an AI technology company may provide machine learning
model building services to data product buyers. However, machine learning
models may be stolen [180], which are regarded privacy of the AI technology
company.
To protect privacy in marketplaces of information goods, various directions
are being explored, such as hiding the information about what, when and how
much a buyer purchases [11], building decentralized and trustworthy privacy
preservation data marketplace [49,102], investigating the tradeoff between pay-
ments and accuracy when privacy presents [149], and aggregating non-verifiable
information from a privacy-sensitive population [83]. There are many studies on
preserving privacy in information goods. We refer interested readers to consult
the rich body of surveys [8, 35, 60, 70, 76, 194, 205] and others. We do not dis-
cuss further details about general privacy preservation techniques in this article,
since privacy preservation techniques are far beyond the scope and capacity of
this survey.
3.2.6 Computational Efficiency
As many information goods may be sold to a huge number of potential buyers, a
pricing model has to match goods/sellers and buyers with an appropriate price.
Computing prices efficiently with respect to a large number of goods and a large
number of buyers presents technical challenges [28].
For example, one reasonable expectation is that a marketplace is polyno-
mial, that is, the complexity of computing prices has to be polynomial with
3https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2020/03/10/leak-millions-amazon-ebay-transactions-exposes-customer-addresses/
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respect to the number of sellers, and cannot grow with respect to the number
of goods/buyers when prices are updated [7]. When auctions are used in de-
termining prices, auction efficiency [89] is required to be fast, which is the time
needed to process bids.
3.3 Summary
Versioning is a common mechanism in designing and pricing information goods,
so that prices of different versions can be linked to values placed by various
customer groups. There are a series of important requirements on pricing infor-
mation goods, including truthfulness, revenue maximization, fairness, arbitrage-
free pricing, privacy preservation, and computational efficiency. Those require-
ments post technical challenges to pricing models.
4 Pricing Digital Products
Although the focus of this article is about pricing data products, we provide
a brief review on pricing digital products here, since some general ideas in
pricing digital products can be borrowed and extended to data products. In
some cases, the boundary between digital products and data products is even
blurry. We first discuss the three major streams of revenues for digital products.
Then, we look at two major types of pricing models. The first is bundling and
subscription, and the second is auctions. These pricing models are popularly
adopted by digital product marketplaces.
4.1 Streams of Revenues
As discussed in Section 3.2.2, revenue maximization often serves as the basic
objective in pricing mechanisms, including pricing digital products. Therefore,
the understanding of pricing digital products can naturally start with an analysis
of possible ways where revenues of digital products may come from.
Lambrecht et al. [118] summarize that there are three streams of revenues
for digital products that are delivered online.
• Money. A provider can sell to customers content or, more broadly, ser-
vices, such as movies and e-books.
• Information/privacy. Instead of charging customers directly, a provider
can collect customer information by tracking (e.g., using cookies) and sell
the information about customers to generate revenues.
• Time/attention. A provider can sell space in their digital products to
advertisers to produce revenue.
15
Often, a firm has to design a revenue model for its digital products that
combine more than one revenue stream. The three streams are not independent.
Instead, they compete with each other, and thus a good tradeoff has to be
settled [77]. On the one hand, in some situations, revenues from money stream
may be increased at the cost of those from time/attention stream. For example,
customers may pay for the content and avoid ads [157, 160], or convert from
free versions to premium versions with fitting functions [187]. On the other
hand, customers may be highly price sensitive in some digital products, and thus
growth in time/attention stream may be easier. For example, an online news site
experiences a dramatic loss of customer visits after introducing a paywall [44].
Free samples may stimulate long-term sales [37]. A possible tradeoff between
money and time/attention has to be carefully designed.
Typical approaches in revenue models of content and services [162] include
rigid pricing (e.g., each movie is priced at a fixed price), designing pricing tiers
(e.g., basic versus premium versions), setting up duration of subscription plans
(e.g., 6 months of promotion period with very low subscription price) and de-
signing freemium models. One important and unique feature in digital product
consumption is micropayments, which means a customer can pay a very small
amount that is typically impractical in traditional transactions using standard
credit cards due to network service fees. Micropayments and subscriptions have
different effects on consumer behavior [20].
As a concrete example of revenue models, consider pricing software prod-
ucts [121]. The major parameters of pricing models include formation of price,
structure of payment flow, assessment base, price discrimination, price building
and dynamic strategies. The formation of price considers price determination,
that is, cost-based, value-based or competition-oriented, as well as degree of
interaction, unilateral versus interactive. In terms of payment flow, it may
be by single payment, recurring payments or combination. The assessment
base of pricing may be usage-dependent (e.g., by transaction or time) or usage-
independent (e.g., server types and GPU).
As the tracking costs of digital products are low, a firm can collect customer
personal data and sell such data for revenue, that is, generating revenues from
information/privacy stream. Typically, personal data may include customers’
identities, behavior patterns, preferences and needs. There are various ways to
sell customer data, which are also discussed in Section 5 when data products and
their marketplaces are discussed. For example [32, 36], a website can provide
direct marketing companies user activity information. Moreover, websites can
also collaborate with data management platforms (DMP, for advertising) [66]
and produce revenues by facilitating businesses to identify audience segments.
For example, the information about how customers are connected in social net-
works can be used to design customized discounts in marketing campaigns [199].
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Bergemann and Bonatti [33] develop a model of pricing customer-level informa-
tion such that the data about each customer is sold individually and individual
queries to the database are priced linearly. As new technologies of customer
tracking become available, more pricing models may emerge.
We want to point out that selling customer data, though serves the purpose
of selling digital products, crosses the boundary between selling digital products
and data products. We review some studies on setting prices of customer data
and privacy information in the next section.
To produce revenues from time/attention stream, many digital product pro-
ducers and service providers embed advertisements in their products in one
way or the other, and obtain remarkable or even dominant advertising income.
However, as John Wanamaker (1838-1922) wisely said, “Half the money I spend
on advertising is wasted; the trouble is I don’t know which half.” It is well
recognized that it is hard to accurately measure advertising effects [92, 123].
Advertisers customize ads for online display [176,198].
One feasible way to improve advertising effectiveness is to combine user
information and advertising opportunities. Retargeted advertising [119] is such
an approach, which combines customer online and offline behavior data and
makes firms focus on customers showing prior interest in the related products.
As another example, Athey et al. [21] consider customers with multiple homes
and investigate the advertising strategies and effectiveness.
In summary, digital product and service suppliers produce revenues through
three major streams, money, information/privacy and time/attention. Orthog-
onally, a firm can bundle its digital products and also design subscription plans
that provide products and services in a specific period for a price, which is
discussed next.
4.2 Bundling and Subscription Planning
As discussed in Section 2.1.3, the low replication costs of information goods
allow prevalent adoption of bundling in pricing digital products [169].
Product bundling organizes products or services into bundles, such that a
bundle of products or services are for sale as one combined product or service
package. Product bundling is a common marketing practice, particularly in the
traditional industry like telecommunication services, financial services, health-
care, and consumer electronics.
Designing product bundles essentially is a combinatorial optimization prob-
lem. The basic and static setting is that a customer wants to buy either one or
multiple products at a time, which is investigated well before digital products
are available [6]. A series of studies [18,137,158] develop pricing strategies with
two products under different types of bundling. They share the basic assump-
tion that demand for a bundle is elastic comparing to demand for individual
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products. For example, Armstrong [18] studies the scenarios where products
may be substituted or provided by separate sellers.
Bundling multiple products is analyzed, often under the independent value
distribution framework [141]. Consider the situation where there are n het-
erogeneous products for one buyer, and the objective is to maximize expected
revenue. Assume that the value distributions on products are independent.
That is, for each product xi, the price that the buyer would like to pay for is
an arbitrary distribution Di in range [ai, bi], where 0 ≤ ai ≤ bi <∞, and those
distributions D1, . . . , Di are independent from each other. Further assume that
the buyer is additive, that is, the buyer’s value for a set of products is the sum
of the buyer’s values of those individual products in the set. Babaioff et al. [50]
show that either selling each item separately or selling all items together as a
grand bundle produces at least a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. This
interesting and important result allows a simple yet effective bundling strat-
egy: either pricing each product individually or pricing the grand bundle in the
expected price. In practice, many platforms such as Hulu and Amazon Prime
Video offer grand bundle subscription for their products.
More recently, Haghpanah and Hartline [94, 95] show that grand bundle is
optimal if more price-sensitive buyers consider the products more complemen-
tary. When multiple buyers are considered, whose preferences are unknown,
Balcan et al. [30] give a simple pricing model that achieves a surprisingly strong
guarantee: in the case of unlimited supplies, a random single price achieves ex-
pected revenue within a logarithmic factor for customers with general valuation
functions. This result allows great convenience in practice, that is, setting a uni-
form price for all products. It is easier to price a bundle of a larger number of
products, since the law of large numbers allows to predict customers’ valuations
more accurately for a larger bundle of products [2].
Orthogonal to bundling, subscription is to price the interactions between
customers and a platform over a period of time. Subscribing customers are
in general heterogeneous in both usage rate and value of products. On the
one hand, customers with higher usage rates may prefer subscribing to larger
subscription sets. On the other hand, in order to maximize revenue, the platform
wants customers with lower usage rates to subscribe, and customers with higher
usage rates to rent. Moreover, different users may have different values for a
product. Many platforms offer subscription and renting at the same time. For
a platform, the subscription model is to select a subscription fee and the period
for each set of products and also set the rental price for each product [13].
Alaei et al. [13] follows the model of grand bundle and consider grand sub-
scription, a single rental price for the set that includes all products. They
establish the sufficient and necessary condition for the optimality of grand sub-
scription. They also show that subscription fees can be set proportional to the
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cardinality of a set of products and can achieve 14 log 2m+logn of the optimal rev-
enue for n types of customers and m types of products. This approximation is
tight in the sense that in cannot be improved more than Ω( 1logn ) in polynomial
time.
After all, modeling bundling and subscriptions is computationally challeng-
ing due to the combinatorial nature. Dynamic pricing bundles and subscriptions,
such as promotions and coupons, have rarely been touched yet.
4.3 Auctions
Auctions have a long history back to the Babylonian and Roman empires [172].
There are many excellent surveys on auctions (e.g., [24,67,111,136]). A compre-
hensive review on auctions is far beyond the scope and capacity of this article.
In this article, we instead only focus on the important role of auctions as a
pricing mechanism for digital products.
4.3.1 Basics about Auctions
There are four basic types of auctions widely used.
• In the ascending-bid auction (also known as English auction), the price is
raised successively until only one bidder remains, who wins the object at
the final price.
• The descending auction (also known as the Dutch auction) works the other
way by starting at a very high price and lowering the price continuously,
until the first bidder calling out and accepting the current price.
• In the first-price sealed-bid auction, every bidder submits a bid without
knowing the others’ bids. The one making the highest bid wins and pays
at the named price.
• The second-price sealed-bid auction (also known as the Vickrey auc-
tion [184]) works in the same way as the first-price sealed-bid auction
does, except that the winner pays only the second highest bid.
There are two basic models of the value information in auctions. The private-
value model assumes that every bidder has an independent value on the object
for sale. The value is also private to the bidder only. The pure common-
value model assumes that the actual value of the object for sale is the same
for all bidders, but bidders have different private information about that actual
value. Every bidder adjusts her/his estimate of the actual value by learning
other bidders’ signals. There are also models considering both values private to
individual bidders and common to all bidders.
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One fundamental principle in auction theory is the revenue equivalence the-
orem [141, 165, 184, 185], which essentially states that, for a set of risk-neutral
bidders with independent private valuation of an object drawn from a common
cumulative distribution that is strictly increasing and atomless on [vmin, vmax],
any auction mechanism yields the same expected revenue and thus any bidder
with valuation v making the same expected payment if (1) the object is allocated
to the bidder with the highest valuation; and (2) any bidder with valuation vmin
has an expected utility of 0. Based on the revenue equivalence theorem, the four
basic types of auctions lead to the same payment by the winner and the same
revenue.
While most studies in auction theory make some simple assumptions about
independence of customer valuations, empirical studies [101] demonstrate that,
in practice, the wrong assumption of valuation independence causes inefficient
auctions in e-commerce.
4.3.2 Sponsored Search Auctions
Online ad and sponsored search auctions [117, 161, 183] are one important ap-
plication of auctions in pricing digital products. Sponsored search [105] is the
business model where content providers pay search engines for traffic to their
websites. In sponsored search, advertisers and, more generally, content providers
bid for keywords in search engines, and search engines decide which ad to dis-
play in which position to answer a query from a user. GoTo.com created the
first sponsored search auction [105].
Different pricing models can be used in sponsored search auctions, such as
pay-per mille4/pay-per impression (PPM), pay-per-click (PPC), and pay-per-
action (PPA). In the early days of sponsored search, a generalized first price
auction is used. Each advertiser bids on multiple keywords, and can set a
bidding price for each keyword. When a user query is answered, which is a
keyword, the top k bids on the keyword in price are displayed. If an ad is
clicked by the user, the corresponding advertiser pays the bidding price. The
first price auction mechanism is unstable, costs advertisers time and reduces
search engine profits [63]. Later, Google generalizes the second price auction
mechanism [64], and enhances the ranking of bids by additional information,
such as the ad’s click-through-rate (CTR), keyword relevance, and ad’s landing-
page/site quality.
There are many in depth analyses about sponsored search auction mech-
anisms (e.g., [161]). For example, some studies analyze auction mechanisms
based on assumptions about rationality, budget constraints and CTR distribu-
tions. Some other studies look at practical sponsored search systems and discuss
auction mechanisms when the standard assumptions do not hold. Another group
4The cost of 1,000 advertisement impressions.
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of studies, such as [22, 42, 52, 78], conduct empirical studies to understand bid-
ding behavior and statics. Last and latest, deep learning approaches are used
to develop auction strategies in sponsored search [164,203].
4.3.3 Auctions on Digital Products with Unlimited Supplies
One unique feature of digital products is that the replication costs are very
low and thus may have almost unlimited supply. Products of unlimited supplies
bring new challenges and opportunities to auction mechanism design. For exam-
ple, the second price auction can be straightforwardly generalized for k identical
products – the top k highest bidders win and each pays the (k + 1)-th bidding
price. However, when there are unlimited identical products, the (k + 1)-th
bidding price approaches 0. The lack of competition due to obsessive supplies
prevents bidders from offering any high prices. In other words, the challenge is
how to ensure the bids are truthful, that is, reflecting the bidders’ true valuation
of the digital products.
Denote by B the set of bidders, and by b1, b2, . . . the bidding prices in de-
scending order, that is, bi ≥ bi+1 ≥ 0 for any i > 0. Suppose the generalized
second price auction mechanism is used. That is, if k bids are taken, those
winning bidders each pays the cost bk+1. The auction objective is to maximize
k ·bk+1. An auction is competitive if it yields revenue within a constant factor of
the optimal fixed pricing. It is tricky that, when there is unlimited supply, the
Vickrey auction is not competitive if the seller chooses the number of products
to sell before knowing the bids, and is not truthful if the seller chooses after
knowing the bids [89].
Goldberg et al. [89] propose the first competitive auction for digital goods
with unlimited supplies. The major idea is the smart framework of random
sampling auction. An auction is bid-independent if bidder i’s bid value should
only determine whether the bidder wins the auction, but not the price. We
select a sample B′ of B at random, independent from the bid values. We use
the bids in B′ to compute the optimal bid threshold fB′ that maximizes the
revenue in B′, and every bidder in B − B′ whose bid value is over fB′ wins.
Symmetrically, we use the bids in B−B′ to compute the optimal bid threshold
fB−B′ that maximizes the revenue in B−B′, and every bidder in B′ whose bid
value is higher than fB−B′ wins. In general, fB′ = fB−B′ does not necessarily
hold. Random sampling auctions are competitive, no matter the single-price
version or the multi-price version. Indeed, random sampling auctions are 15-
competitive in the worst case [69] and 4-competitive for a large class of instances
where there are at least 6 bids that are as good as the optimal sale price [14].
There are a series of improvements on random sampling auctions. For example,
Hartline and McGrew [98] further improve the competitiveness.
Goldberg and Hartline [86] extend the scope from single digital product with
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unlimited supply to multiple products with unlimited supplies. Given a set of
bids, they show that the bidder-optimal product assignment given the bids and
the optimal sale prices can be determined by solving the integer programming
problem as follows.
max
∑
j
∑
i xijrj
subject to
rm = 0∑
j xij ≤ 1 1 ≤ i ≤ n
xij ≥ 0 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m
pi + rj ≥ aij 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m∑
i pi =
∑
j
∑
i xij(aij − rj)
(3)
where xij is the assignment of product j to bidder i, rj is the optimal price for
product j, pi is the profit of bidder i, and aij is bid from bidder i on product j.
Then, we can solve the optimal pricing problem in the following random
sampling auction. Let B be the set of bidders. First, we obtain a sample B′ of
bidders. Second, we compute the optimal sale prices for B′. Last, we run the
fixed-price auction on B−B′ using the sale prices computed in Equation 3. All
bidders in B′ lose the auction. The random sampling auction is shown truthful
and competitive [86].
Most of the proposed auctions for digital goods with unlimited supply are
randomized auctions. Goldberg et al. [89] show that no deterministic auction
can be competitive. Aggarwal et al. [9] later point out that the result does
not hold for asymmetric auctions [135]. In a symmetric ex ante auction, buyers’
preference parameters are drawn from a symmetric probability distribution, and
thus there exists a symmetric equilibrium if an equilibrium exists at all. In an
asymmetric auction, each buyer has the same information about the product but
a different opportunity cost of obtaining the product, that is, bidders’ valuations
are drawn from different distributions. Aggarwal et al. [9] give an asymmetric
deterministic auction that can approximate the revenue of any optimal single-
price sale in the worst case. Indeed, they develop a general derandomization
technique to transform any randomized auction into an asymmetric determinis-
tic auction with approximately the same revenue. The general idea follows the
deterministic maximum flow solution to the well-known hat problem [62].
4.3.4 Envy-free Auctions
One drawback in random sampling auctions is that some bidders may lose even
they make bids higher than some winning bidders do, since the bidders in B′
and B − B′ use different thresholds (i.e., fB−B′ and fB′ , respectively) in the
one product version and all bidders in B′ lose in the multiple product version.
Goldberg and Hartline [88] establish a fundamental result: an auction can-
not be truthful, competitive and envy-free at the same time. They also explore
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possible tradeoffs between truthfulness and envy-freeness based on the consen-
sus revenue estimate (CORE) technique [87]. Specifically, using a similar idea
in combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents [16], we can relax the
truthfulness requirement by requiring being truthful with probability (1 − ),
and always guarantee envy-free. The auction is highly truthful when  ap-
proaches 0 and the number of winners in the auction approaches infinity. The
other type of auctions relaxes the envy-free requirement to being envy-free with
probability (1− ), and guarantees truthfulness. Both auctions are competitive
and the probability is over random coin tosses made by the randomized auction
mechanism and not the input.
4.3.5 Online Auctions
In addition to potentially unlimited supply, another important feature of digital
goods is that a digital good may be sold repetitively, such as a movie and a song.
Therefore, auctions on digital goods may run continuously instead of only one
round. Moreover, customers may want to have prompt answers to their bids.
Online auctions [120] are designed to address the setting where different
customers bid at different times. The auction mechanism has to make decisions
about each bid as it arrives. An (online) auction is incentive compatible if the
bidders are rationally motivated to reveal their true valuations of the object.
Lavi and Nisan [120] show that an online auction is incentive compatible if and
only if it is based on supply curves under the assumption of limited supply, that
is, before it receives the i-th bid bi(q), it fixes the supply curve pi(q) based on
the previous bids, and (1) the quantity qi sold to customer i is the quantity
q that maximizes the sum
∑q
j=1(bi(j) − pi(j)); and (2) the price paid by i is∑q
j=1 pi(j). They also propose incentive compatible auctions for limited supply.
To tackle the challenges when there is unlimited supply, Bar-Yossef et al. [31]
point out that supply curves are not available anymore. Instead, they propose
an extremely simple incentive-compatible randomized online auction. For each
bidder i, it picks a random number t ∈ {0, . . . , blog hc} and sets the price thresh-
old to si = 2
t, where h is the ratio of the highest valuation against the lowest
valuation among all bidders. This auction is O(log h)-competitive.
The auction mechanism can be further improved to achieve even better
incentive-compatibility. Specifically, we can divide a sequence of bids b1, b2, . . .
into l = (blog hc + 1) buckets, such that bucket Bj contains the bids with in-
dexes in range [2j , 2j+1). The weight of bucket Bj is the sum of bids within Ij ,
that is, wj =
∑
i∈Bj i. A new bidder can choose one of the buckets at random
with the probability proportional to the bucket weight, and pays the price of the
lowest bid of the bucket. The price si that bidder i pays follows the probability
distribution Pr[si = 2
j ] =
( wj∑l−1
r=0 wr
)d
, where d is a parameter. The auction is
shown O(3d(log h)
1
d+1 )-competitive. By setting d =
√
log log h, the auction is
23
O(exp(
√
log log h))-competitive.
4.4 Summary
As revenue maximization plays a fundamental role in pricing digital products,
we review the three major streams of revenues for digital products, namely
money, information/privacy, and time/attention. Then, we revisit bundling
and subscription planning for digital products, which echoes the opportunities
and challenges due to low replication costs of information goods. Auctions are
widely used in pricing digital products. We review some basic types of auctions
and their applications in digital products, including sponsored search auctions,
auctions with unlimited supplies, envy-free auctions and online auctions. Some
ideas employed by pricing digital products are also used in pricing data products,
as to be discussed in the next section.
5 Pricing Data Products
In this section, we discuss pricing in marketplaces of data. We first obtain
an overall understanding about data markets and the major players in such
markets. Then, we look into several most studied technical problems in data
product pricing, including arbitrage-free pricing, revenue maximizing pricing,
fair and truthful pricing and privacy preservation in data marketplaces. Last,
we discuss pricing dynamic data and online pricing.
5.1 Data Markets and Pricing, What Are They?
Marketplaces for data have been actively developed for over a decade. An early
survey [167] identifies different categories and dimensions of data marketplaces
and data vendors in 2012. There are many studies on various issues about data
markets and pricing strategies. Before we discuss any specifics in detail, it is
important to obtain an overall understanding about data markets, such as what
are sold and for what purposes, who are the sellers, who are the buyers, and
what are the basic pricing models.
Pantelis and Aija [156] present a brief economic analysis of data taxonomy
as a market mechanism. Data and databases are legally protected by either
copyright or database right. Copyright protects expression and significant cre-
ative effort that creates and organizes data. Database right protects a whole
database. One challenge is that both copyright and database right are hard to
enforce due to the non-rivalrous nature of data.
In general, data may be owned by governments, private parties or individ-
uals. Consequently, data can be categorized into three types: open, public,
and private data [156]. Open data are common pool resources [155], such as
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the data made available by the open data initiatives. Public data, such as the
data collected by the government in the United States, are valuable resources
subject to the “tragedy of the commons” [97]. Public data are often produced
by individuals or organizations for research and used by governments and lo-
cal authorities, but may also be employed by commercial parties to enhance
their proprietary resources or services. Private data are generated by private
applications or services.
To understand what are sold in data markets and for what purposes,
Muschalle et al. [140] consider the common queries and demands on data mar-
kets, as well as the pricing strategies. They observe two major types of queries.
The first type of queries is to estimate the value of a “thing” or compare the
values of “things”, where examples of the “things” are like webpages for ad-
vertisements, starlets, politicians and products. The second type is to show
all about a “thing”. Those queries are raised by seven categories of beneficia-
ries, namely analysts, application vendors, data processing algorithm develop-
ers, data providers, consultants, licensing and certification entities, and data
market owners. They also identify three types of market structures. First, in
a monopoly, a supplier is powerful enough to set prices to maximize profits.
Second, an oligopoly is dominated by a small number of strong competitors.
Last, in strong competition markets, prices may align with marginal costs.
A series of pricing strategies and models may be considered in data mar-
kets [140]. First, free data may be obtained from public authorities, may help
to attract customers and suppliers of commercial data, and may be integrated
into private and not-free data products. Second, prices can be based on usages,
such as charging customers per hour of data usage. Third, package pricing al-
lows a customer to obtain a certain amount of data or API calls for a fixed fee.
A few studies [109, 193] try to optimize package pricing models. Fourth, in the
flat fee tariff model, a data product or service is offered at a flat rate, regardless
of usage. It is simple, easy to use. The drawback is the lack of flexibility, partic-
ularly for buyers. Fifth, combining package pricing and flat fee tariff results in
two-part tariff, that is, a fixed basic fee plus additional fee per unit consumed.
This model is popular in data services. Specifically, Wu and Banker [192] show
that, under zero marginal costs and monitoring costs, flat fee and two-part tariff
pricing are on par, and two-part tariff is the most profitable strategy. Last, in
the freemium model, users can use basic products or services for free and pay
for premium functions or services.
Recently, machine learning, particularly deep learning [91], becomes dis-
ruptive in many applications, such as computer vision [130, 186] and natural
language processing [200]. In most situations, powerful deep models heavily
rely on large amounts of training data [145]. Monetization of data and machine
learning models built on data through markets gains stronger and stronger in-
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terests from industry. Specific to data as an economic good and data pricing
as a monetization mechanism in this context, a series of studies focus on data
utility for model building and the associated pricing, particularly considering
privacy.
Some data owners may have detailed knowledge of specific machine learn-
ing tasks and thus dedicate corresponding effort to collect high quality data for
building better models. Babaioff et al. [23] study the design of optimal mecha-
nisms for a monopoly data provider to sell her/his data. Specifically, they show
that it is feasible to achieve optimal revenue by a simple one-round protocol, that
is, a protocol where a buyer and a seller each sends a single message, and there
is a single money transfer. The optimal mechanism can be computed in polyno-
mial time. For a buyer who may abort the interaction with a seller prematurely,
multiple rounds of partial information disclosure interleaved by payments may
be needed to ensure optimal revenue. Cummings et al. [48] study the optimal
design for data buyers to purchase data estimators with different variances and
combine the estimators to meet a required quality guarantee on variance with
the lowest total cost.
The role of privacy in data collection and machine learning model building
is investigated. For example, Ghosh and Roth [84] develop auctions that are
truthful and approximately optimal for data buyers to obtain accurate estimates
on data from owners who are compensated for privacy loss. They show that the
classic Vickrey auction [184] can minimize the buyer’s total payment and meets
the accuracy requirement. They also develop a mechanism that can maximize
the accuracy given a budget.
In general, modeling data owners’ costs of privacy loss is very difficult, since
the costs may correlated with private data arbitrarily. It is impossible to design
a direct revelation mechanism that can provide a non-trivial guarantee on accu-
racy and, at the same time, is rational for individual data owners. To tackle the
issue, Ligett and Roth [128] design a take-it-or-leave-it mechanism, by randomly
approaching individuals from a population and making offers. This mechanism
can be used for some data collection scenarios, such as surveys.
Versioning is an important strategy in data pricing. A data seller can
customize data into different versions according to buyers’ needs. Berge-
mann et al. [34] develop the optimal menu of information products that a
monopoly data supplier can offer to a data buyer, so that one product can fit the
buyer’s willingness to buy the information at the offered price, and the revenue
is maximized. One important finding is that information products indeed allow
larger scopes of price discrimination. There are at least two dimensions that
sellers can explore to derive various subsets of a data set, namely data quality
and data position.
When data are used to build machine learning models, it is important to as-
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sess the value of each data record within a data set. There exist various methods
for assessment, such as leave-one-out [47], leverage or influence score [46]. Ghor-
bani and Zou [82] propose to apply the Shapley fairness on the data used to
train a machine learning model, and thus define data Shapley for a record i in
a training data set D as
ψi = C
∑
S⊆D−{i}
V (S ∪ {i})− V (S)(
n−1
|S|
)
where C is an arbitrary (positive) constant, and V (S) is the performance score
of the model trained on data S ⊆ D. One challenge is that computing the
exact data Shapley values on large data sets for sophisticated models, such as
deep neural networks, is computational prohibitive. Ghorbani and Zou [82] also
develop Monte Carlo and gradient-based methods for estimation.
Data quality is an important issue [159]. There are many studies on assess-
ment of data quality [99, 159, 189]. Some studies specifically focus on pricing
based on data quality and the impact on data markets. Heckman et al. [99] pro-
pose a simple linear model Value of data = fixed cost+
∑
i wi ·factori, where the
factors include but are not limited to age of data, periodicity of data, volume
of data, and accuracy of data, and wi is the associated weight. One practical
difficulty in using the model is that the parameters in the model are hard to
estimate. Another difficulty is that many data sets do not have public prices
associated. Yu and Zhang [201] consider pricing multiple versions formed by
multiple factors of data quality and build a two-level model. The first level is
the data platform where a single owner is assumed, who designs the number
of versions. The second level is the customers who want to maximize the data
utility. Each level is modeled as a maximization problem and thus the whole
model is a bi-level programming problem, which is NP-hard.
Another way to form multiple versions of data products is to charge by
queries [113–116]. Intuitively, a data seller may treat a view of a data set as
a version. Setting the price for every possible view is not only tedious but
also tricky. If prices on views are not set properly, arbitrages or less than
highest prices may happen. Koutris et al. [113, 116] propose a framework of
query and view based data pricing. The major idea is that a seller only needs
to specify the prices on a few views, and then the prices of other views can
be decided algorithmically. Their advocate two desiderata, arbitrage-freeness
and discount-freeness. Theoretically, they show the existence and uniqueness of
pricing functions satisfying the requirements. They also show the complexity
of computing the pricing functions. Unfortunately, only selection views and
conjunctive queries without self-joins are tractable. They present polynomial
time algorithms for chain queries and cyclic queries.
Technically, the core idea in the view and query based pricing framework is
query determinacy [146, 147, 168]. A query Q is said to be determined by a set
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of views V if the answer to Q can be completely derived from the views. Query
determinacy enables the feasibility of arbitrage detection. If V determines Q,
then arbitrage happens if and only if the price of V is cheaper than that of Q.
Koutris et al. [115] further explore the technical challenges in practical im-
plementation of view and query based data pricing. Specifically, they develop
an integer linear programming formulation for the pricing problem with a large
number of queries. Considering the scenario where a user may purchase multiple
queries over time or the database is updated, such that information in multi-
ple queries and updates may have overlaps, they also leverage query history to
avoid double charging. To handle the situation where there are multiple sellers,
they define the share of a seller as the maximum revenue that the seller can
get among all minimum-cost solutions, and accordingly define a fair revenue
distribution policy. A prototype demonstration system is reported in [114].
Tang et al. [178] follow the view and query based pricing framework but con-
sider the minimum granularity of data, that is, each tuple is a view. Their model
assigns to each tuple a price and prices queries based on minimal provenances.
Tang et al. [177] extend view and query based pricing to XML documents and
consider the situation where a customer may just want to purchase a sample
instead of the complete query result.
5.2 Arbitrage-free Pricing
Arbitrage is probably the most intensively studied issue in pricing data products.
As introduced in Section 3.2.4, in general, arbitrage is the activities that take
advantage of price differences between two or more markets or channels. Arbi-
trage is undesirable in many pricing models. Unfortunately, arbitrage may sneak
in pricing models without rigorous design. For example, Balazinska et al. [28]
analyze that subscription based pricing possibly with a query limit allows ar-
bitrage. Muschalle et al. [140] point out that a pricing model charging users
a certain amount of API calls for a fixed rate may potentially allow arbitrage,
depending on the package size.
Arbitrage-freeness is one of the fundamental properties of pricing mod-
els in query and view based pricing [113–116]. Li and Miklau [125] and
Li et al. [124] develop frameworks of pricing linear aggregate queries. Specif-
ically, Li et al. [124] consider linear queries. Given a data set of n tuples
x1, . . . , xn, a linear query q = (q1, . . . , qN ) is a real-valued vector, and the an-
swer q(x) =
∑n
i=1 qixi. For a multiset of queries S = {Q1, . . . ,Qk} and query
Q, if the answer to Q can be linearly derived from the answers to the queries
in S, then Q is said to be determined by S, denoted by S→ Q. A pricing func-
tion pi(Q) is arbitrage-free if for any multiset S and query Q such that S→ Q,
pi(Q) ≤∑ki=1 pi(Qi).
Under the general intuition of arbitrage-freeness, Li et al. [124] consider a
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specific form of queries, linear queries with variance (q, v), that is, the estimation
of the answer to query q should have a variance no larger than v. Using different
values of v, different versions are formed. A pricing model not carefully designed
may allow arbitrage.
Li et al. [124] first establish the observation that pi(q, v) = Ω( 1v ). Then,
they synthesize pricing function pi(q, v) = f
2(q)
v , which is arbitrage-free if f
is positive and semi-norm5. For any arbitrage-free pricing functions pi1, . . . , pik,
f(pi1(q), . . . , pik(q)) is also arbitrage-free if f is a subadditive
6 and nondecreasing
function.
As Roth [166] summarizes, the framework by Li et al. [124] still faces three
important challenges. First, arbitrage is still possible to derive answers to a
bundle of queries from another bundle of queries and their answers. Second,
arbitrage is still possible on biased estimators for statistical queries. Last, it
is unclear whether we can obtain arbitrage-free pricing maximizing profit given
the distribution of buyer demands. Later, Deep and Koutris [53] provide some
interesting insights to arbitrage-free pricing for bundles.
Lin and Kifer [129] investigate arbitrage-free pricing for general data queries.
They consider three types of pricing models for query bundles, where a query
bundle is a set of queries posted simultaneously as a batch. First, an instance-
independent pricing function depends on the query bundle but not the database
instance. Second, an up-front dependent pricing function depends on both the
query bundle and the database instance. A customer knows an un-front depen-
dent pricing function, and decides whether to purchase or not the query answers.
Last, a delayed pricing function depends on both the query bundle and the an-
swer computed by the query bundle on the current database instance. The
customer knows the pricing function, but do not know the exact price. Once
agreeing, the customer is charged when the answers are computed.
They [129] also summarize five different types of arbitrage situations. First,
if prices are quoted by queries, in order to avoid price-based arbitrage, answers
to queries should not be deduced from prices along. Second, a buyer may
use multiple accounts to derive answers to a query bundle. To avoid separate
account arbitrage, the price of a query bundle [q1, q2] should be at most the sum
of the prices of q1 and q2. Third, if the answers to a query bundle q
′ can always
be deduced from answers to another query bundle q, to prevent post-processing
arbitrage from happening, the price of q should be no cheaper than that of q′.
Fourth, although the answers to a query bundle q may not be always derivable
from the answers to another query bundle q′ on all database instances, still for a
specific database instance I, the answers to q may be derived from the answers to
5A function f : Rn → R is semi-norm if for any c ∈ R and any query Q ∈ Rn, f(cq) =
|c|f(q); and for any q1,q2 ∈ Rn, f(q1 + q2) ≤ f(q1) + f(q2).
6A function f is subadditive if for any x1, . . . , xk, f(
∑k
i=1 xi) ≤
∑k
i=1 f(xi).
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q′. If so, a serendipitous arbitrage happens. Last, if two queries behave almost
identical but their prices are dramatically different, almost-certain arbitrage
happens. Based on the above categorization, they discuss conditions that can
prevent various types of arbitrage situations from happening.
Pricing many queries in real time with formal guarantees on arbitrage free-
ness is challenging. Many theoretical methods are not scalable in practice. For
example, it takes QueryMarket [115] about one minute to compute the price of
a join query over a relation of about 1000 tuples. Qirana [54, 55] is a system
for query-based pricing. The system allows data sellers to choose from a set of
pricing functions that are information arbitrage-free, which covers both post-
processing arbitrage-freeness and serendipitous arbitrage-freeness in Lin and
Kifer’s taxonomy [129]. Qirana also supports history-aware pricing. Qirana
has been shown highly efficient and scalable on TPC-H7 and SSB8 benchmark
datasets as demonstration.
The key idea in Qirana is that it regards a query as an uncertainty reduction
mechanism. Initially, a buyer faces a set of possible databases I defined by
a database schema, primary keys and predefined constraints. Once a buyer
obtains the answer E to a query Q, all possible databases D such that E 6=
Q(D) are eliminated. The price assigned to Q should be a function of how
much the set of possible databases shrinks. For example, let S be the set of
possible databases before the query Q is answered. S is called the support set.
Then, a weighted coverage function assigns a weight wi to every Di ∈ S, and
computes the price to a query by pwc(Q,D) =
∑
Q(Di)6=Q(D) wi. Alternatively,
consider the equivalence relation in S: Di ∼ Dj if and only if Q(Di) = Q(Dj).
Assign to each possible database Di ∈ S a weight wi such that
∑
Di∈S wi = 1.
Let PQ be the set of equivalence classes. For each class B ∈ PQ, denote by
wB =
∑
Di∈B wi. The Shannon entropy function is used to compute the price of
query Q as the entropy of the query output PH(Q,D) = −∑B∈PQ wB logwB .
The q-entropy function (also known as Tsallis entropy) for q = 2 is used to
assign to Q the price PT (Q,D) =
∑
B∈PQ wB(1− wB). Deep and Koutris [53]
show that the weighted coverage function, the Shannon entropy function and
the 2-entropy function are all arbitrage-free.
Using the complete set of possible databases as the support set leads to
a #P -hard problem. To make the price calculation computationally feasible,
Qirana uses uniform random sample and random neighboors as the support sets.
In targeted advertising markets, user data, such as opt-in email addresses,
and user impressions are sold as data products. How to price users9 properly
to avoid arbitrage is important. Xia and Muthukrishnan [196] consider the
7http://www.tpc.org/tpch.
8http://www.cs.umb.edu/?poneil/StarSchemaB.PDF
9Here, “buying a user” is short for purchasing the impression of a user in online advertising
and a user email in targeted email advertising, for example.
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following problem. Denote by qi a selection query over user attributes, by Ui
the set of all users satisfying qi, and by pi the price of each user in Ui. If a
buyer purchases n users (1 ≤ n ≤ |Ui|) in Ui, she/he has to pay n · pi. If
prices of different queries are not well coordinated, version-arbitrage may arise.
If two queries qi and qj return similar user sets but pi is dramatically more
expensive than pj , then a user who wants qi may purchase qj instead. Xia
and Muthukrishnan [196] point out that uniform pricing, that is, every query
has the same price, is arbitrage-free, but is a logarithmic approximation to the
maximum revenue arbitrage-free pricing solution. Then, they present a greedy
non-uniform pricing design. The design starts with the optimal uniform pricing
that is arbitrage-free, and then iteratively updates the pricing function. If the
price of a query can be updated to increase the revenue, it is increased so that the
arbitrage-free property is retained. This greedy algorithm is still a logarithmic
approximation to the maximum revenue arbitrage-free pricing solution.
Chen et al. [43] develop an arbitrage-free pricing design for multiple versions
of a machine learning model. They assume that a broker trains the optimal
model on the complete raw data. Then, random Gaussian noises are added
to the optimal model to produce different versions for different buyers. The
rationale is that the error of a machine learning model instance is monotonic
with respect to the variance of the noise injected into the model. In this setting,
a pricing function is arbitrage-free if and only if the price of a randomized model
instance is monotonically increasing and subadditive with respect to the inverse
of the variance.
5.3 Revenue Maximization Pricing
As explained in Section 3.2.2, the objective of maximizing revenue is often of
special interest in designing pricing strategies, since for a business to be suc-
cessful long term, a more immediate and important requirement is to win over
as many customers as possible.
Revenue maximization pricing for data products is a relatively less explored
area. As mentioned in Section 5.2, Xia and Muthukrishnan [196] develop log-
arithmic approximation pricing algorithms for revenue maximization in user-
based markets. They also consider the situations where both the maximum
number (i.e., maximum demand) and the minimum number (i.e., minimum
demand) of users that a buyer purchases are specified, and provide an O(D) ap-
proximation algorithm to revenue maximization, where D is the largest minimal
demand among all buyers.
Chawla et al. [41] consider query and view based pricing for arbitrage-free
revenue maximization under the assumption that all buyers are single-minded
and the supply is unlimited. A buyer is single-minded if the buyer wants to
purchase the answer to a single set of queries. They consider three types of
31
pricing functions. Uniform bundle pricing sets the price of every bundle iden-
tical. Additive or item pricing prices each item and charges a bundle the sum
of prices for the items in the bundle. Fractionally subadditive pricing or XOS
sets k weights w1j , . . . , w
k
j for each item j, and for a bundle e, the price is set
to maxki=1
∑
j∈e w
i
j . Building on the extensive studies on revenue maximization
with single-minded buyers and unlimited supply [29, 39, 93], they develop new
heuristics.
Specifically, it is well known that there exists uniform bundle pricing that
is O(logm) approximation of revenue maximization, where m is the number
of bundles. Swamy and Cheung [175] show that item pricing can achieve an
O(logB) approximation of maximum revenue, where B is the maximum num-
ber of bundles an item can involve. Chawla et al. [41] show some new lower
bounds, that is, uniform bundle pricing, item pricing and XOS pricing combin-
ing a constant number of item pricing functions are still Ω(logm) away from
maximum revenue. They also present approximation algorithms.
To maximize revenue in machine learning models, Chen et al. [43] show
that the optimization problem is coNP-hard. Thus, they relax the subadditive
constraint p(x + y) ≤ p(x) + p(y) by q(x)x ≥ q(y)y for every 0 < x ≤ y, and
turn to finding a pricing function q() such that q(x)x is decreasing with respect
to x. They show that, for every well standing pricing function p(), there exists
a pricing function q() with the relaxed subadditive constraint such that p(x)2 ≤
q(x) ≤ p(x), and q(x) can be computed using dynamic programming in O(n2)
time, where n is the number of interpolated price points.
5.4 Fair and Truthful Pricing
Fairness and truthfulness are important for data product markets. Recall that
fairness refers to that the revenue generated by a sale transaction in the data
market is distributed among sellers in an unprejudiced manner so that they
are paid for their marginal contributions. Truthfulness means a market where
buyers are well motivated to report their internal valuations of data products
unwarily.
Agarwal et al. [7] propose a mathematical model of data marketplaces that
are fair, truthful, revenue maximizing, and scalable. They assume each seller
j supplies a data stream Xj , each buyer n conducts a prediction task Yn,
Xj , Yn ∈ RT . For example, Xj may be a stream of customers’ interest on differ-
ent products, and Yn is a task predicting a new customer’s interest. Taking a pre-
diction task Yn and an estimate Yˆn, a prediction gain function Gn : R2T → [0, 1]
measures the quality of the prediction. The value that buyer n gets from esti-
mate Yˆn is µn · G(Yn, Yˆn), where µn is the price rate that the buyer is willing to
pay for a unit increase in G. A machine learning model M : RMT → RT uses
data from M sellers to produce an estimate Yn for buyer n’s prediction task Yn.
32
Let pn and bn be the price and the bid, respectively. Then, allocation function
AF : (pn, bn;XM ) → X˜M measures the quality at which buyer n obtains that
is allocated to the sellers on sale XM , where X˜M ∈ RM . Revenue function
RF : (pn, bn, Yn;M,G, XM ) → rn calculates how much revenue rn ∈ R+ to
extract from the buyer. The utility that buyer n receives by bidding nn for Yn
is
U(bn, Yn) = µn · G(Yn, Yˆn)−RF(pn, bn, Yn),
where Yˆn = M(Yn, X˜M ) and X˜M = AF(pn, bn;XM ). A market is truthful if
for all prediction tasks Yn, µn = arg maxz∈R+ U(z, Yn). They adopt the notion
of fairness following the famous Shapley fairness [171].
One main result [7] is that, the data market defined as such is truthful
if and only if function AF∗ is monotonic, that is, an increase in the difference
between price rate pn and bid bn leads to a decrease in predication gain G. They
also give randomized -approximation algorithms for fair data market, that is,
||ψn,Shapley − ψˆn||∞ <  with probability 1− δ, where ψn,Shapley is the Shapley-
fair payment division among sellers, ψˆn is the output of the approximation
algorithm, and δ,  > 0. Their algorithms are polynomial.
Shapley fairness [171] is popularly adopted as the foundation of fairness
in data markets. However, computing Shapley value is exponential [56].
Maleki et al. [132] present a permutation sampling method that approximates
Shapley value for any bounded utility functions. The basic idea is to use Equa-
tion 2 and tackle ψ(s) = E[U(Ppis ∪ {s}) − U(Ppii )] by sample mean. Follow-
ing Hoeffding’s inequality [100], to achieve an (, δ)-approximation, that is,
P (|sˆ − s|p ≤ ) ≥ 1 − δ, where sˆ is the estimate, we need 2r2N2 log 2Nδ sam-
ples and evaluate the utility function O(N2 logN) times, where r is the range
of the utility function U .
Jia et al. [107] present approximation algorithms for Shapley value that can
substantially reduce the number of times that the utility function is evaluated.
First, they apply the idea of feature selection using group testing [59,206]. For
user s, let βs be the random variable that s appears in a random sample of
sellers. Then, for sellers si and sj , the difference in Shapley values between si
and sj is
ψ(si)− ψ(sj) = 1N−1
∑
S∈D\{si,sj}
U(S∪{si})−U(S∪{sj})
(N−2|S| )
= E[(βsi − βsj )U(βs1 , . . . , βsj )]
where U(βs1 , . . . , βsj ) is the utility computed using the sellers appearing in the
random sample. They can use group testing to first estimate the Shapley dif-
ferences and then derive the Shapley value from the differences by solving a
feasibility problem. They show that this algorithm is an (, δ)-approximation
that evaluates the utility function at most O(
√
N(logN)2) times. They further
observe that most of the Shapley values are around the mean. Exploiting this
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approximate sparsity, they give an (, δ)-approximation algorithm that evaluates
the utility function only O(N(logN) log(logN) times.
Ghorbani and Zou [82] propose a principled framework of fair data evalua-
tion in supervised learning, and Monte-Carlo and gradient-based approximation
methods. Their Monte-Carlo method follows a general idea similar to that in
Jia et al. [107]. They generate Monte-Carlo estimates until the average empir-
ically converges. They also argue that, in practice, it is sufficient to estimate
the Shapley value up to the intrinsic noise in the predictive performance on
the test data set. Adding one tuple as a training data point does not signifi-
cantly affect the performance of a model trained using a large training data set.
Therefore, truncation can be used in practice based on the bootstrap variation
on the test set. In their gradient Shapley method, they train a model using one
“epoch” of the training data, and then update the model by gradient descent
on one data point at a time, where the marginal contribution is the change in
the performance of the model.
In general, computing Shapley values requires an exponential number of
model evaluations. However, for some specific model, the computation may be
reduced dramatically. For example, Jia et al. [106] show that for unweighted
kNN classifiers, the exact computation needs only O(N logN) time and an
(, δ)-approximation can be achieved in O(Nh(,k) logN) time when  is not too
small and k is not too large. They also propose a Monte-Carlo approximation
of O(N(logN)
2
(log k)2 ) for weighted kNN classifiers. A key enabler of the progress is
the specific utility function of a kNN classifier
ν(S) =
1
k
min{k,|S|}∑
i=1
1[yαi(S) = ytest]
where αi(S) is the index of the training feature that is the k-th closest to xtest
among the training examples in S. Moreover, the sublinear approximation for
unweighted kNN classifiers is facilitated by locality sensitive hashing [51].
Related to fairness and truthfulness in a market, cooperation among differ-
ent agents in a market may happen. Building trust in a sub-community within
a data marketplace becomes an interesting subject. Armstrong and Durfee [17]
analyze factors that may influence the efficiency of building trust and conduct-
ing cooperation in a data market. For each agent in a market, the other agents
can be divided into two categories, namely those remembered agents and those
strange or forgotten agents. They have a few interesting findings. Cooperations
arising from iterated interactions is inversely proportional to the rate of sys-
tem mixing, the number of initially misbehaving agents, and the rate at which
agents explore alternative strategies. Cooperation is also initially inversely pro-
portional to population size. At the same time, cooperation is proportional to
average member size and better estimation of the likelihood of strange agents
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to misbehave.
5.5 Privacy Preserving Marketplaces of Data
Privacy is a serious concern and also a critical tipping point in designing mar-
ketplaces of data. When a user shares her/his data with some others, the user
may disclose her/his privacy to some extent. Therefore, it is important to ex-
plore how to protect or minimize the privacy leakage. At the same time, it is
also important to understand how a seller’s privacy disclosure may be properly
compensated through data pricing.
Ghosh and Roth [84] design truthful marketplaces where data buyers want
to purchase data to estimate statistics and sellers want compensation for their
privacy loss. In the design, there is only one query and the individual evaluation
of their data are private. Data owners are asked to report the costs for the
use of their data. Under the assumption of differential privacy [60, 61], they
transform the problem into variants of multi-unit procurement auction. They
show that, when a buyer holds an accuracy goal, the classic Vickrey auction can
minimize the buyer’s total cost and guarantee the accuracy. When the buyer
has a budget, they give an approximation algorithm to maximize the accuracy
under the budget constraint.
The method by Ghosh and Roth [84] may not work well when the costs
and the data are correlated. For example, a store with more customer traffic
may request a higher cost in using the data. Correspondingly, reporting the
cost may reveal the privacy of the store. Fleischer and Lyu [72] tackle the
scenario where costs are correlated with data and propose a posted-price-like
mechanism. Given a set of data sellers categorized into different types and the
associated distributions of costs, the mechanism offers each user a contract with
the expected payment corresponding to the type. If a seller takes the offer,
the payment is determined by the seller’s verifiable type and the associated
payment in the contract. All sellers have the same probability to take or reject
their contracts independently. The sellers are truthful, that is, a user takes the
offer if the payment is larger than or equal to the privacy loss. This posted-price-
like mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible (i.e., every seller’s strategy is
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium), ex-interim individually rational (i.e., the expected
utility is non-negative for every seller when the seller decides truthfully), O(−1)-
accurate, perfectly data private (i.e., whenever the mechanism’s posterior belief
about a seller’s data differs from its prior belief, the mechanism pays the seller)
and -differentially private.
Li et al. [124] tackle the same problem as Ghosh and Roth [84] do, but
assume that individual valuations are public and focus on returning unbiased
estimations and pricing multiple queries consistently. To address the concerns
on privacy loss, they develop a theoretical framework to divide the price among
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data owners who contribute to the aggregate computation and thus have loss
of privacy. Their framework extends several principles from both differential
privacy and query pricing in data markets.
The fairness mechanism considered by Li et al. [124] only compensates a
seller whose data are used. Niu et al. [152] further consider the scenario where
multiple sellers’ data are correlated and extend to dependent fairness. In de-
pendent fairness, a seller s is still compensated if the data of another seller s′
are used that are correlated with the data of s. They propose two approaches
to privacy compensation. In the bottom-up approach, the broker first satisfies
each individual seller’s privacy compensation and then decides the price for the
statistic selling to a buyer. In the top-down design, the broker decides the total
price of a data aggregate product sold to a buyer, and then spares a fraction of
the total price for privacy compensation. The privacy compensation is divided
and assigned to individual data sellers by solving a budget allocation problem.
Each seller receives a compensation roughly proportional to the privacy loss
due to the data sharing. Niu et al. [150] further extend to time series data that
may have temporal correlations. They adopt Pufferfish privacy [110] to measure
privacy losses under temporal correlations.
While various efforts have been made to address the challenges of privacy
loss compensation when user data are correlated in one way or another, as
Ghosh and Roth [84] point out, in general, it is impossible for any mechanism
to compensate individuals for privacy loss properly if correlations between their
private data and their cost functions are unknown beforehand.
In the classical setting of physical goods [134], using contract theory [133]
with hidden information, that is, unobservable types of buyers, a seller can
design a set of contracts with different consumption levels to maximize revenue
from buyers. Naghizadeh and Sinha [143] extend the contract design model to
price a bundle of queries at different privacy levels to maximize revenue. At
the same time, they also consider adversarial users. Their work also adopts
differential privacy [60, 61]. For a query bundle {Q1, . . . , Qk}, a contract is a
tuple (p, , s), where p > 0 is the price paid by a buyer,  is the privacy budget,
such that a buyer can get an answer to query Qi (1 ≤ i ≤ k) with i-differential
privacy guarantee, and  ≥∑ki=1 i, and p is the post-hoc fine to be paid if the
buyer is found misusing the query answers. It is assumed that an adversarial
buyer derives a benefit C(), which is monotonically increasing and convex,
C(0) = 0. One interesting finding is that, in the traditional contract theory,
if there are n types of honest buyers and one type of adversarial buyers, the
seller should design up to n + 1 contracts. In the data marketplace situation,
they show that up to n contracts are sufficient. In other words, a data seller
should not design a contract for the adversary. Instead, the seller should adjust
the contracts’ pricing to account for the risks from adversarial users. They also
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design post-hoc fines in pricing query bundles that can help to reduce loss due
to privacy leakage by adversarial buyers. They provide a fast approximation
algorithm to compute the contracts.
A data owner has to decide a tradeoff between privacy and data utility. Li
and Raghunathan [126] design an economics-based incentive-compatible mech-
anism for a data owner to price and disseminate private data. Specifically, let
two-part tariff pricing function R(s, x) = αs + βsx be the price for x amount
of data at sensitivity level s, where αs and βs are the fixed and variable price
factors, respectively. Assuming two types of data users, one type for aggregate
information and patterns in data and the other type for individual identity and
personal information, the proposed mechanism works in four stages. First, the
data owner selects a variety of sensitivity types to offer. Second, the data owner
offers different prices for data with different sensitivity types. Third, a data
user selects a certain sensitivity type with corresponding price, and thus reveal
the user type. Last, the data user selects the optimal amount of data with the
chosen sensitivity type. The core idea is that the data owner can identify the
sensitive attributes in the data, such as the identifying attributes, which are not
useful for aggregate analysis but necessary at individual communication. A data
owner can offer a lower price for data without sensitive attributes, and charge
for a higher price for data with sensitive attributes. This approach provides
an orthogonal idea to the popular ways of tuning the parameter in differential
privacy.
Due to the privacy concerns, when a company may have opportunities to
collect data about its customers, should it do it (i.e., collecting and revealing
the data) or not (i.e., a blanket policy of never collecting)? Jaisingh et al. [104]
find that the company should not collect customer data if the total gains from
trading the data cannot cover the privacy loss. In practice, there is an increasing
tendency for consumers to overestimate their loss of privacy, particularly when
the use of the private data is uncertain. In other cases, the company should
offer two contracts on their services and products. One contract collects the
customer data at a certain price, and the other contract does not collect any
customer data at a different price.
While most of the studies on privacy preserving data marketplaces focus
on the privacy of data owners, transactions may also disclose privacy of data
buyers, such as what, when and how much they buy. For example, a retail
company purchasing query results may consider what queries (e.g., the products
or customer groups involved in the queries), when (e.g., the periods where the
queries are concerned), and how much data it purchases as privacy, and may
want to keep the information confidential from any others, including the data
sellers and the broker. Aiello et al. [11] design a mechanism such that after
making an initial deposit and maintaining a sufficient balance, a buyer can
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engage in an unlimited number of price-oblivious transfer protocols where the
sellers and broker cannot know anything other than the amount of interaction
and the initial deposit amount. The broker even cannot know the buyer’s current
balance and when the buyer’s balance runs out. This is achieved by adapting
conditional disclosure [81] to the two-party setting.
Distribution and use of private data are another important step where pri-
vacy may leak. Hynes et al. [102] demonstrate Sterling, a decentralized market-
place for private data, which supports privacy-preserving distribution and use of
data. The central technical idea comes from privacy-preserving smart contracts
on a permissionless blockchain. To provide strong security and privacy guaran-
tees, they combine blockchain smart contracts, trusted execution environments
and differential privacy. Particularly, smart contracts allow enforcement of con-
straints on data usage and enables payments and rewards.
5.6 Pricing Dynamic Data and Online Pricing
Many applications are built on dynamic and online data. How to price temporal
views on data streams properly is an important issue for practical data markets.
One central task is to estimate and optimize the operational costs, which are
the costs to evaluate queries of different users on the fly. The pricing decisions
involve not only data sellers but also data buyers. For example, suppose two
data buyers b1 and b2 purchase two queries q1 and q2, such that q2 can be
written as a further selection on top of q1 (e.g., q1 is about all customers in
North America, while q2 keeps all the same as q1 but focuses on only customers
in Canada). The optimal pricing of q1 and q2 should take the advantage of the
overlap between the two queries so that the sharing can save the operational
costs, and, at the same time, be fair to b1 and b2.
Al-Kiswany et al. [12] propose a greedy method that enumerates all possible
sharing plans and selects the one with the minimum additional cost. It does
not come with any quality guarantee. Liu and Hacigu¨mu¨s¸ [131] propose an
improved method that takes some risk in sharing plan. If the costs of the
previous sharings are already cumulated to a high level, and the additional cost
of a new sharing (i.e., the risk) is moderate and can be amortized well by the
previous sharings, then the new sharing may be taken. They also give five rules
to ensure fair pricing. Let AC(S) be the cost attributed to a sharing S. First,
for two identical sharings S1 = S2, AC(S1) = AC(S2) should hold. Second,
for any sharing S, AC(S) should be no higher than the lowest cost of S if no
other sharing exists. Third, for two sharings S1 and S2, if the query of S1 is
contained by the query of S2, that is, the result of S1 is a subset of the result
of S2, and the lowest cost of S1 is smaller than the lowest cost of S2 if no other
sharing exists, then AC(S1) ≤ AC(S2). Fourth, a sharing plan with common
subexpressions with other sharings should be compensated. Last, the cost of
38
the global plan should be equal to the sum of costs attributed to all sharings.
In order to purchase dynamic data, a buyer may have to call a seller’s API
repeatedly. A buyer may have to pay for the same data multiple times. Upad-
hyaya et al. [181] explore how to modify APIs to achieve optimal history-aware
pricing, that is, buyers are charged only once for data purchased and not up-
dated. The central idea is the introduction of the notion of refund – a user
can ask for refunds of data that she/he has bought before. For each query,
the seller issues a coupon in addition to the query result, where the coupon
records the identity information of the data in the query result. Specifically, a
coupon c = ((id, uid, v), τ,H(id ⊕ τ ⊕ κ)), where id is a tuple identifier, uid is
a user-id, v is a version-id that is monotonically increasing, τ is a query iden-
tifier that is monotonically increasing, H is a cryptographic hash function [58],
such as SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-3, and κ is a secret key only known to the
seller. If a buyer gets two coupons c1 and c2 in two different purchases such
that c1[(tid, uid, v)] = c2[(tid, uid, v)], then the buyer can ask the seller for a
refund by showing the two coupons. As pointed out by Deep and Koutris [54],
the refund mechanism does not provide any arbitrage-free guarantee.
Qirana [54, 55] can support history-aware pricing. To incorporate a query
history, suppose a buyer already purchases queries Q = Q1, . . . , Qk and pays for
a total of p(Q, D) so far. When a new query Qk+1 comes, let the support set
Sk+1 = {Di ∈ S | Q(Di) = Q(D), Qk+1(Di) 6= Qk+1(D)}. Then, the new total
price p((Q1, . . . , Qk, Qk+1), D) = p(Q, D) +
∑
Di∈Sk+1 wi. This history-aware
pricing function is shown arbitrage-free.
Zheng et al. [204] consider online pricing for mobile crowd-sensing data mar-
kets. Different from most of the work on data markets, they assume that data
providers are distributed in space and there are three types of spatial queries
from buyers, namely single-data query (e.g., inquiring the value at a specific lo-
cation), multi-data query (e.g., inquiring the mean in a region) and range query
(e.g., inquiring the probability that the data at a region falls in a given range).
The vendor uses raw data from data providers and produces a statistical model
through Gaussian process to answer queries. To form different versions of data
products, the vendor generates different conditional Gaussian distribution with
respect to locations and uses the conditional entropy to quantify the quality of
the versions. They propose a randomized online pricing strategy so that the
price can be adaptive from the historical queries. They show that the pricing
mechanism is arbitrage-free and is a constant factor approximation of revenue
maximization.
Niu et al. [151] consider online data market where a query may be sold to
different buyers at different time and the broker can adjust prices over time. The
objective is to maximize the broker’s cumulative revenue by posting reasonable
prices for sequential queries. They design a contextual dynamic pricing mecha-
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nism with the reserve price constraint. The central idea is to use the properties
of ellipsoid for efficient online optimization. Their method can support both
linear and non-linear market value models with uncertainty.
5.7 Summary
In this section, we review the topic of pricing data products. We first analyze the
structures, players, and ways to produce data products in data marketplaces.
Then, we examine several important areas in pricing data products, including
arbitrage-free pricing, revenue maximization pricing, fair and truthful pricing
and privacy preserving pricing. We also discuss how to price dynamic data and
online pricing. When pricing data products in a data marketplace, those several
considerations are typically incorporated and integrated in one way or another.
6 Discussion and Open Challenges
Data pricing comes from practical demands and has been tackled in multiple
disciplines. Although there are a rich body of literature addressing a series of
issues in data pricing, there are still many questions remained unexplored. In
this section, we discuss a list of interesting challenges for possible future work.
By no means our list is exhaustive. Instead, we hope our discussion can intrigue
more extensive interest and research effort into this fast growing area.
6.1 Data Supply Chain: A Grand Challenge
At the macro level, although many studies focus on different steps in data mar-
ketplaces, we clearly observe a lack of systematic investigation on data supply
chains and development of end-to-end solutions. As data products are abundant
and diversified, to develop ecologically sustainable marketplaces, supply chains
of data products have to be built. Here, we introduce and advocate the notion
of data supply chains, which connect all parties involved in data production and
consumption, including data providers, data processors, data analysts, data
product and services consumers and other possible roles. Each party in a data
supply chain connects its upstream providers and its downstream consumers,
provides its value-added contributions and obtains gains. Feedback mechanisms
through pricing and marketing have to be created in a data supply chain so that
supply and consumption can be matched, coordinated and balanced. Most of
those problems are not thoroughly thought.
Although the notion of data supply chain is not mentioned in literature,
some specific trends and challenges are discussed sporadically. For example,
Muschalle et al. [140] identify some trends and challenges in data consumption
and marketplaces. First, they assert that many essential data processing tasks
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are essential for data markets, such as labeling, annotating and aggregating
data. Second, data markets will be integrated with numerous application do-
mains. To enable domain data markets, it is important to customize general
data processing technologies for niche domains. Third, customers want to have
data faster. Thus, it is important to create online data query services and de-
velop corresponding pricing models. Fourth, as there are more data, more data
providers and more analysts, a data product may be substituted by others. To
hatch a healthy ecological data marketplace, it is important to establish stan-
dard data processing mashups to facilitate data product substitution. Fifth, to
maintain a fair data market overall, it is important to provide price transparency
so that data product providers have to optimize their data and data process-
ing/analysis services. Last, customer preferences and experience are critical for
data markets.
Most recently, Acemoglu et al. [3] present an insightful study on the eco-
logical effect of data markets. They demonstrate that a user’s sharing of data
may likely reveal some other users’ privacy and depress the price of other users’
data. The depressed prices lead to excessive data sharing and thus further re-
duce welfare. Their study suggests the need of mediation in data sharing in
data markets.
One challenge associated with the macro view of data supply chain is the in-
terdisciplinary nature of data pricing research. As can be observed in this article,
data pricing is studied in many different disciplines, such as economics, market-
ing, electronic commerce, data management, data mining and machine learning.
The communication and dialog among different areas have to be strengthened.
6.2 Some Technical Challenges at the Micro Level
At the micro level, there are many research problems remained open. We name
a few examples of fundamental problems.
First, most of the studies suggest relative prices of data products. Very few
studies connect theoretical models with data pricing practice and investigate
absolute prices of data products and their marketing effect. As data pricing
is a market mechanism and user behavior in practice is hard to modeled com-
pletely, experimental studies of data pricing models are essential and should be
connected to theoretical investigations.
Second, pricing is based on valuation and equilibrium among multiple par-
ties. Different parties may have different valuation on data, data products and
data services. It is important to systematically establish the principles of value
assessment for various parties in data marketplaces, such as data providers,
data owners, data users, and data brokers. Moreover, it is important to un-
derstand what messages are passed to different parties in data marketplaces
through data pricing actions, and how. So far, value assessment of data and ne-
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gotiations among different parties in data marketplaces are largely not analyzed
in detail.
Third, many pricing models are proposed in literature. It is important to un-
derstand how data pricing models and their assumptions can be implemented
and enforced in practice. Specifically, accounting and auditing in data mar-
ketplaces are critical to achieve transparency in data pricing and efficiency in
data marketplaces. Accounting and auditing in data marketplaces, however, are
interesting problems that have not been investigated in depth yet. We need prin-
ciples, quality guarantees and designs of operational procedures for accounting
and auditing in data pricing, transactions and adversary detection.
Fourth, most of the studies on data pricing develop general models. At the
same time, as data science transforms many application domains, data pricing
has to deal with specific applications. Mechanisms, regulations and constraints
in a specific domain may facilitate data pricing in some aspects, and post chal-
lenges in some other aspects. For example, Jia et al. [106] show that, although
fair pricing in general is exponential in computation time but can be achieved
polynomially in kNN models (Section 5.4). It is interesting and highly desir-
able to explore fairness, truthfulness, and privacy preservation of data pricing
in specific applications.
Last but not least, almost all applications are dynamic in nature. The
values of data, data products and data services may also evolve over time. The
changes may be caused by the updates in demands and supplies. It is important
to develop mechanisms to capture and monitor changes in demand and supply
of data, data products and data services, and explore corresponding dynamic
pricing.
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